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EMPLOYMENT DRUG TESTING, PREVENTIVE SEARCHES,
AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY
CRAIG M. CORNISH*
DONALD B. LouRIA**
In 1988, employers tested an estimated eight million Americans
for the use of illegal drugs.1 By 1992, this figure may swell to
twenty-two million.2 This Article focuses upon some of the long-
term effects that institutionalizing mass drug-use testing3 might
have on our society. By examining the role employment drug
testing is playing in our society as a surveillance and control
model, we can begin to see how mass drug testing is likely to
transform certain aspects of our culture. The public has debated
and considered only a few of these potential ramifications.
Widespread drug testing in the American workplace began
with President Ronald Reagan's enactment of Executive Order
12,564, which required executive branch agencies to adopt regu-
lations creating a drug-free workplace, including drug testing of
applicants and employees.4 In 1988, the Department of Transpor-
tation enacted regulations requiring various private transporta-
tion industries regulated by the Department to conduct drug
tests including random testing of its employees under certain
circumstances. 5
In addition to federally mandated workplace drug testing, the
private sector was encouraged to implement drug testing because
economic studies showed that substance abuse among American
workers cost $34 billion annually in lost productivity. Private,
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sity, 1971; J.D., Washburn University, 1975.
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1. See Milt Freudenheim, Booming Business: Drug Use Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1990,
at D1, col. 3 (statement of Michael B. McNulty, Vice president for corporate testing
programs at the Clinical Laboratories unit at SmithKline).
2. KEVIN B. ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL: GUIDELINES AND ALTERNATIVES S 1.01,
at 1-4 (1990).
3. For the purposes of this Article, the term "drug testing" refers to "drug-use testing"
rather than the testing of the quality of drugs. This Article is not concerned with the
mechanics of employment drug testing, nor even its pros and cons.
4. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. S 702(aX2) (1988).
5. See Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug-Testing Programs, 53 Fed. Reg.
47,002 (1988) (codified as amended by 49 C.F.R. S 40.1 (1990)).
6. John P. Morgan, The "Scientific" Justification for Urine Drug Testing, 36 KAN. L.
REV. 683, 685 (1988).
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state, and local governments have embarked upon systematic
testing-often random-of applicants and employees for a variety
of reasons, ranging from reducing industrial accidents, absentee-
ism, health care costs, inefficient employees, dishonest employees,
sick leave, and illegal drug abuse to promoting employee health,
greater productivity, and public confidence in the integrity of a
business. 7
Mass drug testing has exposed or spawned the following mod-
els or effects of mass surveillance and control: (1) Fourth Amend-
ment tolerance of systematic preventive searches; (2) increased
use of biochemical surveillance as a means of monitoring and
deterring undesired behavior; (3) increased use of the workplace
and economic sanctions as a tool of regulating undesirable be-
havior; (4) privatization of traditional law enforcement functions;
(5) shrinkage of our expectations of personal privacy; (6) increased
use of "profiles"; (7) erosion of the presumption of innocence; and
(8) erosion of dignity and autonomy. A discussion of each of these
issues follows.
I. A RUPTURE IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: PREVENTIVE BODY
SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment was adopted to end the government's
preventive search program conducted under the guise of general
warrants and writs of assistance.8 As a result of the development
of drug-testing technology, the Court, in two landmark drug-
testing cases-Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association9
7. For a discussion of the history of employment drug testing and the laws relating to
it, see CRAIG M. CORNISH, DRUGS AND ALCOHOL IN THE WORKPLACE: TESTING AND PRIVACY
(1988); KEVIN B. ZEESE, supra note 2.
8. Writs of assistance were "general warrants authorizing the bearer to enter any
house or other place to search for and seize prohibited and uncustomed goods and [the
writs] commanded all subjects to assist in these endeavors. The writs once issued remained
in force throughout the lifetime of the sovereign and six months thereafter." LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTER-
PRETATION 1156 (1987). "The general warrant, for example, was certainly an effective
means of law enforcement. Yet it was one of the primary aims of the Fourth Amendment
to protect citizens from the tyranny of being singled out for search and seizure without
particularized suspicion notwithstanding the effectiveness of this method." Florida v.
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally JACOB W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT; A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
9. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab'-permit-
ted mass preventive body searches for the first time. Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence came full-circle from prohibiting pre-
ventive searches to permitting them. The decisions evolved in
part from the "surgical" nature inherent in the technology of
drug testing-drug testing detects only the presence or absence
of a single or particular group of drugs. This technology seduced
the Supreme Court into characterizing such searches as "minimal
intrusions,"'" thus permitting this new drug-testing technology
to circumvent the Fourth Amendment. The first obvious impact,
therefore, of mass drug testing has been the fundamental shift
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which, because of the Su-
preme Court's drug-testing cases, now permits mass biochemical
testing of innocent citizens without a warrant, a neutral magis-
trate's ruling, probable cause, or any other basis for believing
that the body to be searched contains evidence of wrongdoing.
A. The Preventive Search Doctrine
Traditionally, law enforcement searches consisted of attempts
to find evidence linking a particular individual to a particular
crime. The Fourth Amendment limits the scope of law enforce-
ment searches by requiring a probability that the search will
yield evidence of a crime.12 The traditional Fourth Amendment
principle requiring a predictive nexus between the place searched
and evidence of a crime protected the vast majority of innocent
people from being subjected to governmental searches of their
persons, homes, or property. In light of the Framers' Fourth
Amendment design to reduce the scope of governmental searches
and to eliminate general warrants and writs of assistance,' 3 this
nexus requirement reasonably served this objective.
Preventive searches are qualitatively different than traditional
searches. First, unlike the traditional law enforcement search,
which is intended primarily to identify or gather evidence of
10. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
11. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
12. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) ("Except
in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a [criminal] case is not
reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable
cause.").
13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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wrongdoing, the preventive search is aimed at deterrence of
wrongdoing through fear of detection. The preventive search is
not expected to yield any evidence of wrongdoing. Probable cause
and individualized suspicion are therefore not relevant to pre-
ventive searches. Their effectiveness is measured by the fact
that such searches do not yield evidence of a crime because the
systematic program of preventive searches has successfully de-
terred wrongdoing. Second, preventive searches systematically
target large areas or groups, rather than individual locations.
Third, a program of preventive searches is open and announced
to its target subjects in order to achieve its deterrent purpose.
Fourth, objective events or criteria, such as fixed locations on a
highway or random selection of social security numbers of em-
ployees, tend to trigger preventive searches. Fifth, the discretion
to search is shifted away from the particular individual searchers
to "neutral" observers, such as legislatures, administrative agen-
cies, committees, or personnel directors, who determine the cri-
teria for selecting the persons to be searched. Sixth, the scope
of the search is usually "surgical"; it collects only a limited
amount of information.
B. Evolution of the Preventive Search Doctrine
The history of the application of the Fourth Amendment to
searches represents a struggle between the government's at-
tempt to gather information and the need to preserve some
privacy for the people. Before the Fourth Amendment, early
Americans were subjected to mass preventive searches in the
form of general warrants and writs of assistance.14 The govern-
ment used these devices to stifle speech and subject many in-
nocent people to invasions of privacy.
Following the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the scope
of the government's power to search narrowed. The Amendment
contains two separate clauses that limit the government's power
to search "persons, houses, papers, and effects."'15 The Warrant
Clause provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."'1 The Reasonableness Clause provides that the "right of
14. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.




the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated."17
Although ambivalently, the Supreme Court frequently con-
strued the Reasonableness Clause in light of the Warrant Clause.18
As Justice Brennan wrote: "[Tihe provisions of the Warrant
Clause-a warrant and probable cause-provide the yardstick
against which official searches and seizures are to be measured."'19
As the Court held in Dunaway v. New York,2 in reference to
seizures:
The "long-prevailing standards" of probable cause embodied
"the best compromise that has been found for accommodating
[the] often opposing interests" in "safeguard[ing] citizens from
rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy" and in
"seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community's protection." The standard of probable cause thus
represented the accumulated wisdom of precedent and expe-
rience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the
kind of intrusion involved in an arrest "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment. The standard applied to all arrests, with-
out the need to "balance" the interests and circumstances
involved in particular situations.2'
As long as the Fourth Amendment requires the government to
possess a certain quantum of evidence from which some proba-
bility exists that the search will yield evidence of wrongdoing,
preventive searches are not possible.
In 1967, the Supreme Court faced squarely the issue of whether
the Fourth Amendment condemns all preventive searches. In
Camara v. Municipal Court, the Court upheld, against a Fourth
Amendment challenge, a city's routine, periodic, area-wide in-
spections of buildings and dwellings. However, if the occupant
refused entry, the Court conditioned such searches upon obtaining
17. Id.
18. For a discussion of the history of the Court's ambivalence in this area, see California
v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1992-94 (1991) (Scalia. J., concurring).
19. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 359-60 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
20. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
21. Id. at 208 (citations omitted). Although Dunaway involved Fourth Amendment
restrictions on arrests, the same principles apply to searches. See also Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) ("[Routinel searches . . . may be made only under the authority
of a search warrant.").
22. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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an administrative search warrant.y The search warrant required
by the Fourth Amendment in Camara did not demand individu-
alized probable cause, but could be based upon "the nature of
the building . . or the condition of the entire area."24 Such an
administrative warrant requires, in effect, group- or area-based
probable cause.
The Court began its analysis in Camara by noting that the
"primary governmental interest at stake [was] to prevent. . . the
unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to
public health and safety."' The Court additionally observed that
"unanimous agreement [existed] among those most familiar with
this field that the only effective way to seek universal compliance
with the minimum standards required by municipal codes [was]
through routine periodic inspections of all structures.."26 Recog-
nizing that strict adherence to the traditional individualized nexus
requirement would deal "a crushing blow"'' to municipal building
code enforcement, the Court held that "there can be no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails."' '
The Court listed four factors that justified deviation from the
traditional individualized nexus requirement:
First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all dan-
gerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful
that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable
results. Many such conditions -faulty wiring is an obvious
example-are not observable from outside the building and
indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself.
Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature
nor aimed at the discovery of crime, they involve a relatively
limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy.P
However, the Court refused to eliminate the need for any kind
of search warrant because the searches would have predictably
adverse consequences to the individual's interest in "self-protec-
23. I& at 540.
24. Id. at 538.
25. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 535-36.
27. Id. at 536.
28. Id. at 536-37.
29. Id. at 537 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
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tion": a municipal criminal charge could be brought against an
individual for refusing entry to a city inspector.3 The adverse
consequence of a positive drug test-loss of employment-is
surely a more severe consequence to one's interest in self-pro-
tection than that commonly associated with a violation of a
housing code.
Nevertheless, Camara began a categorical shift away from
interpreting the Reasonableness Clause in light of the Warrant
Clause to an ad hoc balancing test for searches of buildings by
administrative agencies. In such cases "reasonableness is... the
ultimate standard."31
Camara gave birth to a Fourth Amendment exception to the
warrant requirement known as the "administrative search doc-
trine."32 Prior to the drug-testing cases in 1989, the Court per-
mitted warrantless preventive searches only of commercial
premises33
Eleven years after Camara, the Court, in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,4 upheld preventive stops of automobiles at per-
manent checkpoints near the United States-Mexico border that
involved only brief detention and questioning of occupants. 35 The
purpose of such stops was to check for illegal immigrants. The
Court upheld these fixed checkpoint stops because they did not
include searches of the occupants or the stopped vehicles. 6 If an
intrusion was "minimal," the Fourth Amendment would not re-
quire an individualized nexus between the occupants and illegal
immigration, if "such a requirement would largely eliminate any
deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling opera-
tions."37
Prior to Skinner and Von Raab, lower courts had upheld several
types of preventive searches, such as the inspection of luggage
at airports8 and the use of metal detectors to search people
entering courthouses. 39 The Supreme Court, however, had never
30. Id. at 531.
31. Id. at 539.
32. For the latest administrative search case, see New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691
(1987).
33. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
34. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
35. Id. at 546-47.
36. Id. at 558.
37. Id. at 557.
38. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 10.6 (2d ed. 1987).
39. See id. S 10.7(a); see also Jay Zitier, Annotation, Searches and Seizures: Validity of
Searches Conducted as Condition of Entering Public Premises-State Cases, 28 A.L.R.4th
1250 (1984).
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permitted body searches of a person without probable cause to
believe the search would produce evidence of a crime. 0
C. The Supreme Court's Drug-Testing Cases
In 1989, the Supreme Court issued two landmark opinions
upholding systematic preventive searches.41 In Skinner, the Court
upheld regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Admin-
istration requiring railroad companies to conduct blood and urine
tests of railroad employees involved in accidents resulting in
death, injuries, or property damage.4 2 The Court further author-
ized railroads to conduct breath or urine tests if an employee
violated certain rules, or if a supervisor reasonably suspected
that an employee's acts or omissions contributed to a reportable
accident or incident. 43 The regulations also permitted railroad
companies to require breath tests if a supervisor reasonably
suspected that an employee was under the influence of alcohol
at work.44
In Von Raab, the Court upheld United States Customs Service
regulations that required drug tests of any Customs Service
employee seeking a transfer or promotion into a position that
directly involved the interdiction of illegal drugs, required the
carrying of a firearm, or gave the employee access to classified
material.45
Because the regulations permitted systematic searches of large
groups of employees without regard to whether the individuals
tested had engaged in wrongdoing, the Court was once again
confronted with the problem of how to interpret the Fourth
Amendment in a way that remained true to its purpose, text,
and history without dealing a crushing blow to the federal gov-
ernment's regulatory scheme.
In both cases, the Court began its Fourth Amendment analysis
by separating analytically governmental searches based upon
"special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
40. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1985) (discussing factors used to
determine constitutionality of a body search).
41. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
42. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
43. Id. at 630-34.
44. Id. at 611. In both Skinner and Von Raab, the blood or urine was tested for illegal
and prescription drugs. Id. at 609; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 662.
45. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
102 [Vol. 33:95
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enforcement" from law enforcement searches in criminal cases.46
In such cases, the government's interests must be balanced
against the privacy interest affected by the search. 7 "[W]here
the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and
where an important governmental interest furthered by the in-
trusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individ-
ualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence
of such suspicion." 4 Because an individualized nexus requirement
will almost always jeopardize the efficiency of a preventive search
program,49 or any search for that matter, the only real obstacle
in Skinner and Von Raab to permitting systematic drug testing
was whether blood and urine testing would meet the "minimal"
intrusion standard that the Court previously said was a prereq-
uisite to cutting loose the individualized nexus requirement.
The Court had never before announced any principle or stan-
dard by which to measure the degree of intrusiveness of a search.
It had only held searches of buildingss° and various types of
stops5' to be minimally intrusive. In Skinner, the Court looked
at four factors to determine the intrusiveness of the drug-testing
procedures: the scope of information collected, the manner of the
intrusion, and the cultural and governmental environments in
which the search was conducted.52
The unique fact of these cases is that the drug-testing tech-
nology can hone in on a microscopic amount of information, thus
providing an extremely tight fit between the goal of the search
and the information collected. If the government's preventive
search program had utilized searches of employees' homes, cars,
purses, or briefcases-which would inescapably compel the
searcher to observe information having nothing to do with the
46. Id. at 665; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. Both cases quote New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
48. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
49. According to the Court in Skinner, a search warrant was not necessary because
"in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in
those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral
magistrate to evaluate," and because imposing a search warrant requirement would
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search. Furthermore, the Court deter-
mined that both the probable cause and individualized suspicion requirements would be
inconsistent with the preventive nature of the search program. Id. at 622-24.
50. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
51. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968).
52. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-28.
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objectives of the search-the Court would probably not have
characterized such searches as "minimally intrusive."53
This surgical search characteristic had been appealing to the
Supreme Court for some time.r In United States v. Place,s the
Court held that subjecting an airline passenger's luggage to a
"canine sniff' for the presence of drugs was not a search.5 In
United States v. Jacobsen,57 the Court held that a Drug Enforce-
ment Agent's chemical field testing of a plastic bag containing
white powder for the presence of cocaine was also not a search.0
The Court in Skinner, however, held drug testing to be a search
because blood and breath testing require an infringement upon
bodily integrity.59 Urine testing "can reveal a host of private
medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is
epileptic, pregnant or diabetic," and the process of collecting
urine "implicates privacy interests."' 0
The fact that the Court upheld drug testing is not what is so
frightening. More distressing are the Fourth Amendment holes
that have been left in the wake of Skinner and Von Raab that
are likely to widen even further. One could make a superficially
plausible argument that Skinner and Von Raab are sui generis
and narrowly limited to their facts. One could argue that Skinner
applied only to employees in positions in which drug impairment
could lead directly to physical harm to themselves or to others.
The Court destroyed that distinction in Von Raab by permitting
preventive drug tests of employees to promote "probity," or
public confidence in the integrity of employees in certain posi-
tions.61
53. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("The appropriate
standard for a workplace search does not necessarily apply to a piece of closed personal
luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase that happens to be within the employer's business
address:').
54. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (holding that a transfer of a
can of chemicals that contained an electronic homing device was not a search or seizure
because the device conveyed no information that the defendant wished to keep private).
55. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
56. Id. at 707.
57. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
58. Id. at 123 ('governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine,
and no other arguably private fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.").
59. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989).
60. Id. at 617.
61. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670-71 (1989). Lower
courts have used this rationale to uphold testing of Department of Justice employees
holding top secret national security clearance in Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 865 (1990), and of United States Army drug
[Vol. 33:95
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One could argue that preventive biochemical searches are lim-
ited to groups of individuals for whom some type of group
suspicion of illegal drug use exists. This idea was also rejected
in Von Raab as a limiting principle.6 2 The Court was undaunted
by the fact that no evidence proved that Customs Service em-
ployees and applicants subject to testing used illegal drugs.63
It is difficult to gauge the precedential impact of any given
case, but one can safely predict that future Supreme Court cases
will narrow only the scope of protections under the Fourth
Amendment. Skinner and Von Raab emphasized the fact that
suspicionless preventive searches were permissible under the
Fourth Amendment in part because each case involved interests
other than normal law enforcement needs. Within one year,
however, the Court permitted suspicionless law enforcement so-
briety checkpoints to deter drunk driving.4 In 1991, the Court
upheld another form of suspicionless preventive stop: police may
now randomly approach passengers inside buses to request per-
mission to search their luggage and personal belongings for
drugs.65 It is difficult to predict when the Court will simply
reverse its past precedents to make room for easier law enforce-
ment searches, as the Court did this year in California v. Acevedo.66
Von Raab and Skinner indicate that the Court has accepted
deterrence as a valid purpose -for searches of persons under the
Fourth Amendment. Formerly, social institutions would search
only the few people whom the institutions had cause to believe
were engaged in wrongdoing. Now, we have found a Court willing
counselors in National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 864 (1990). Compare National Treasury Employees Union
v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that. Department of Agriculture policy
of mandatory drug testing of employees who do not hold safety- or security-sensitive
jobs violates the Fourth Amendment) udth Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that the only employees of a county department of corrections that may
permissibly be tested are those who come into contact with prisoners or have opportu-
nities to smuggle drugs to prisoners, not those employees whose tasks are merely
administrative) and American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp. 294
(D.D.C. 1990) (preliminarily enjoining mandatory post-accident drug testing of employees
with respect to workers not employed in safety-sensitive positions).
62. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674.
63. Id.
64. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Silz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
65. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
66. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (overruling United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) and
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), which held, respectively, that to open a footlocker
or a closed container located in a properly stopped automobile was a Fourth Amendment
violation). The Court's precedents are becoming increasingly tenuous: "[Tihis Court has
never felt constrained to follow precedent. . . . Stare decisis is not an inexorable com-
mand; rather, it 'is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to
the latest decision.' "Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-10 (1991) (citations omitted).
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to allow us to search everyone else in hopes of deterring the
guilty few. This acceptance threatens to subject millions of in-
nocent people to government searches and represents a major
shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Our nation's fascina-
tion with employee drug testing has produced this Fourth Amend-
ment revolution.
II. THE NEW USE OF BIOCHEMICAL SURVEILLANCE TO MONITOR
AND CONTROL BEHAVIOR
Every society identifies forbidden behavior. Every society also
establishes the means to enforce behavioral norms through var-
ious techniques of surveillance and punishment. Traditionally,
surveillance of forbidden behavior was conducted through visual
observation and written documentation. As technology pro-
gressed, society developed increasingly sophisticated means of
monitoring illegal behavior: binoculars, transponders, computer
monitoring, electronic eavesdropping, and high-tech aerial pho-
tography s7 Each of these forms of surveillance monitors the
outward behavior of an individual. Drug testing, however, rep-
resents a new kind of surveillance: surveillance of the inside of
a person, surveillance of one's biochemistry.
We are entering a new era in which biochemical surveillance
is used to regulate behavior in addition to its potential health-
promotion purposes. To be sure, medical and psychological ex-
aminations that gather similar "internal" information are not
new, but powerful institutions use such diagnostic technology
sparingly to monitor and shape behavior, or to condition employ-
ment . 8 Not only is the biological search a relatively recent
development, but the vast scope of its application is also unprec-
edented.
Criminal justice agencies have employed drug testing to mon-
itor and promote law-abiding behavior in persons charged with
67. The government has increased its use of these sophisticated monitoring devices:
Without notice ... the Bush Administration has escalated the use of wire-
tapping to a level nearly twice that of the Reagan Administration. During
the Reagan years, the amount of wiretapping exceeded that in previous
administrations by 20 percent.
In 1990, the Department of Justice asked for and received from federal
judges authorization to install electronic surveillance 324 times, exceeding
the all-time record ....
Wiretaps Under Bush: Upward and Onward, 17 PRIVACY J. 1, 3 (Aug. 1991).
68. For a discussion of the history and analysis of medical examinations in the work-




or found guilty of crimes6 9 For example, police use breathalyzers
for this purpose if evidence indicates that a person committed
the crime of driving while impaired. Indirectly, polygraph tests
purport to measure or detect past wrongful behavior through
surveillance of the internal process of emotional guilt created by
lying to deny wrongful behavior.70 In contrast to present-day
drug testing, however, these forms of testing target only indi-
viduals reasonably believed to have violated the law, a limitation
that narrows dramatically the scope of persons subjected to such
testing. Within a few years, we have come to accept mass drug
testing even though the overwhelming majority of those tested
test negative. 71 Recent public opinion polls reflect widespread
support for mandatory employee drug testing.72
This social experimient will have serious transforming conse-
quences in the future. If drug testing is cost-effective and reduces
illegal drug use, society will find new uses for similar testing.
Surveillance of any kind is not conducted for its own sake. The
information collected is used to make decisions about people that
affect important aspects of their lives.
Drug testing at the worksite has been proposed as a health
measure to detect drug users and persuade or compel them to
accept rehabilitation. This rationale assumes that those detected
through surveillance need rehabilitation or treatment. In the
absence of a need for treatment for the majority of users detected
and in the absence of established effective treatment, employment
drug-use testing as a health benefits paradigm cannot be sus-
tained. Rather, it is intended primarily to cause those who would
use certain drugs to forego such use. In other words, the drug
tests are used to shape applicant and employee behavior. Because
drug testing can detect marijuana use within seven to twenty-
eight days after the use,73 drug testing at the worksite obviously
detects use away from the worksite, often in one's home or the
homes of others.
69. See Eliot Marshall, Testing Urne for Drugs, 241 ScI. 150, 151 (1988).
70. Of course, the reliability and the theory of polygraphy-that lying leads to conscious
conflict which m turn produces a meAsurable physiological response-is subject to differ-
mg scientific views. For a discussion of the theory and application of polygraphy, see
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, US. CONGRESS, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH
TESTING: A RESEARCH REVIEW AND EVALUATION (1983) and DAVID LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN
THE BLOOD: USE AND ABUSES OF TH Lm DETECTOR (1980).
71. See, e.g., Craig Zwerling et al., The EfJ)cacy of Preemployment Drug Screensng for
Marijuana and Cocatne sn Predicting Employment Outcome, 264 JAMA 2639, 2641 (1990).
72. See Tom Shoop, Urnalysss Update-Random Drug Testing of Federal Workers s
Maring Headway, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Feb. 1990, available zn LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omm
File.
73. Zwerling, supra note 71, at 2640.
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Another rationale for worksite testing is the desirability of
having employees obey the laws that pertain to drug use, but
drug testing in the workplace has little to do with obeying the
law. Urine tests have quantitative cutoffs, designed in various
programs to focus on heavier or more recent users, or to reduce
false positive rates.74 If smaller amounts of illicit drugs are
detected on quantitative analysis, the test is recorded as nega-
tive.75 Thus, the test results are not focused on the law because
only heavier users are identified for possible action. Moreover,
most employers do not conduct breathalyzer tests of employees
operating motor vehicles, ignoring those persons who are driving
illegally.
Furthermore, the underlying supposition that recreational users
of marijuana or cocaine are a danger to themselves or others at
the worksite, or that they are less productive than nonusers is
surprisingly unpersuasive. In a recently published study, the
authors observed that the extent of drug-related absenteeism,
termination, and disciplinary action was far less than they had
anticipated.76 In addition, their positive results showed interdrug
inconsistencies and their analysis did not take into account the
possible effects of alcohol.77 Another of the very few peer-re-
viewed articles in the medical literature found no effect from
drug use on worksite performance. 78 Other critics of drug testing
highlight the misleading nature of the data used to justify drug
testing.79 Regardless of motivations concerning employee health,
productivity, or safety, the major effect of drug testing at the
worksite is to compel behavioral conformity, both at the work-
place and in individuals' private lives away from the worksite.
Technology for carrying out urine tests has improved remark-
ably over the last twenty years and the technology will only get
better in the future. The widespread acceptance of mass system-
atic drug testing will pave the way for other forms of biochemical
surveillance that will be used to regulate behavior and to affect
important opportunities in life. The next wave of new tests will
enhance the government's and employers' abilities to predict
74. ROBERT P. DECRESCE ET AL., DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 59 (1989).
75. John P. Morgan & Pamela S. Puder, Urinary Testing for Drugs of Abuse in the
Military, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 374, 383 (1989).
76. Zwerling, supra note 71, at 2643.
77. Id.
78. David C. Parish, Relation of the Pre-Employment Drug Testing Result to Employment
Status: A One-Year Follow-Up, J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S 4:44-47 (1989).
79. Morgan, supra note 6, at 692.
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individual susceptibility to various diseases.80 This information
could be used to require diet, medication, medical treatment,
lifestyle, or employment changes to reduce these risks. Some
employers have already tried to exclude fertile women from
working in certain chemical environments out of fear of genetic
damage to their potential offspring.8
One of the techniques now being rapidly explored is the iso-
lation and identification of single genes that either promote or
suppress disease. These technological advances could also be used
for surveillance purposes. For example, an employer could advise
a person who has a gene that promotes lung cancer not to
augment that gene's activity by smoking or by exposing the gene
to common lung carcinogens in the workplace. The employer
could urge such individuals to get plenty of carotenes in their
diets or in dietary supplements to attempt to reduce their in-
creased risk of lung cancer.
In the near future, blood tests may characterize the genetic
makeup of an individual. An employer might be able to predict
a potential employee's propensity to develop heart disease, can-
cer, arthritis, or major mental disease, any of which could cause
loss of productivity and substantial medical expense. Having a
group of employees with substantial health risks will increase
health insurance premiums and reduce the profits of the em-
ployer. As genetic technology improves and gene therapy be-
comes available, individuals who have been subjected to a genetic
test could be required to undergo treatment to modify those
genes that create extraordinary risks to illness or disease. Having
workers with healthy genomes could even result in insurance
premium discounts.P
The capacity for complete genetic analysis should be achieved
by the end of the next two decades83 During that twenty-year
period, many interim technological advances will provide* an ex-
traordinary amount of genetic information; possibly most of the
expressions of human genes will be deciphered within a few
80. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GENETIC MONITORING AND
SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE 14041 (1990).
81. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (holding
that sex-specific fetal protection policies violate title VII as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act).
82. For a discussion of biochemical testing by employers, see infra notes 85-96 and
accompanying text.
83. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE AD HOC PROGRAM ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON COMPLEX GENOMES (D. Baltimore ed., 1988).
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years.8 Consequently, by the end of this two-decade era, and
perhaps within this decade, apprehensions about the invasion of
privacy incurred by having body fluid observed for information
about drug use will be dwarfed by anxieties about privacy created
by our stunning technological advances.
If the genome analysis enters a networked computer system,
the consequences for the employee could be catastrophic. Such
disclosures could affect employment opportunities, life insurance
or health insurance premiums, or bank loans. In a sense, having
one's genome in another's computer is a form of bio-psycho-social
rape, and the potential misuse of information about that genome
is a perpetual Sword of Damocles. If biochemical surveillance is
used this way in the future, it will be significantly caused by
society's unrestrained embrace of mass drug testing today.
III. USING THE WORKPLACE AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO
REGULATE BEHAVIOR
Intuition suggests that employment drug testing today will
effectively reduce illegal drug use among those who might be
tested. Coupling economic sanctions with biochemical surveillance
can be a very potent tool in regulating behavior. If all employers
required employees to wear crew cuts as a condition of employ-
ment, a majority of adults would be sporting crew cuts.
Our legal system uses both economic credits and criminal
sanctions to encourage and discourage behavior. Only recently,
however, have we begun to withhold very important economic
benefits, which many would consider entitlements or basic ne-
cessities, if an employee engages in undesired behavior. For
example, we now deny federal grants to individuals who use
illegal drugs. The federal government now mandates that recip-
ients of federal grants or financial assistance require employees
to report all convictions for drug offenses occurring in the work-
place to their employers who, in turn, must report them to the
federal funding agency.6 The Drug-Free Workplace Act requires
employers either to punish an employee convicted of a workplace
84. Mark D. Adams et al., Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed Sequence Tags
and Human Genome Project, 252 Sci. 1651 (1991).
85. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. S 702(a)(2) (1988).
86. Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, S 5153, 41 U.S.C. S 702.
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drug offense or to require the employee to enter a drug aware-
ness or rehabilitation program.87 The City of Miami passed an
ordinance requiring the police to report drug-related arrests to
the arrestee's employer.P Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland
has denied medical benefits to repeat drunk drivers who are
injured in accidents they themselves caused.P Congress withholds
student financial aid from persons convicted of drug crimes. ° G.I.
Bill benefits are denied to veterans who fail to apply timely as
a result of alcoholism or drug abuse9 Public housing is denied
to tenants and their families when tenants engage in illegal drug
dealing.2 Driver's licenses are withheld from young persons who
drop out of school9 3
These examples show an increase in the emphasis on the use
of economic sanctions to control behavior that was formerly
regulated primarily by criminal sanctions. Economic sanctions
may be a more effective tool than the criminal sanction for
individuals who care about employment, education, housing, li-
censes, or health care. This approach may be promoted in part
because such programs might avoid many of the constitutional
protections that inhibit effective enforcement in the criminal
justice system.P
Although these ideas may be effective in the war against drug
abuse, once we realize the effectiveness of biochemical surveil-
lance and economic sanctions in regulating a person's life, we are
likely to use those tools together to regulate other behavior. For
example, employers who want to reduce health care costs of
employees and dependents may prevent certain behaviors such
as cigarette smoking, and monitor compliance through biochemi-
cal testing.95 Many employers now monitor the amount of time
87. I& S 703.
88. Miami Beach to Report Drug Arrests to Employers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991, at
A15.
89. Keith Schneider, Stopping Drunken Drivers Before the Next Wreck, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 1991, at A16.
90. See 45 C.F.R. S 1170.3(j) (1981) (excepting drug and alcohol abusers from federal
financial assistance programs under nondiscrimination regulations for the handicapped).
91. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988).
92. Dirk Johnson, Target: Gangs that Plague Housing, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1989, § 1,
at 9; see, e.g., Deborah Marquardt, Running the Drug Dealers out of Public Housing, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1989, S 8, at 1.
93. No School, No License, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1989, at A28.
94. In New York City and Portland, Oregon, authorities have been using public nuisance
laws that do not even require a criminal conviction to evict suspected drug dealers. Mere
arrests can support a finding of a public nuisance. See Now, Cities Hit Drug Suspects
Where They Live, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991, at B16.
95. See, e.g., Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1987)
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their employees exercise.9 To the extent that we can monitor a
person's diet, employers may also require certain diets and mon-
itor adherence to them through biochemical tests.
All of the new forms of biological surveillance and control of
individuals raise questions about the relationship between the
individual and society as a whole. Should any aspect of the
individual be immune from societal surveillance and regulation
even if it will not advance the common good? Should an individual
be denied employment, housing, or education just because he
chose to take certain drugs, forego certain prescription medica-
tions, or refuse compliance with the employer's diet? Should
individuals' lives be shaped by biochemical profiles?
Because using economic sanctions to control behavior circum-
vents procedural due process afforded to the criminally accused
under state and federal constitutions, we are likely to see new
areas of rights developing similar to what we now see in the
common law of employment.
IV. PRIVATIZATION OF TRADITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS
Budget crunches are forcing federal, state, and local govern-
ments to cut back, rather than expand, governmental services.
In recent years, federal, state, and local governments have been
contracting out services such as food services, street maintenance
and repair, medical services in jails, and solid waste collection. 97
One area in which this delegation has occurred is in the field
of regulating illegal drug use. By legislation and regulation, the
federal government has encouraged and required private industry
to conduct drug-use surveillance and to punish drug-using Amer-
ican citizens.98 Numerous regulations promulgated by the United
States Department of Transportation require the private trans-
portation industry to conduct mass testing-including random
(forbidding firefighters to smoke during first year on the job is not a violation of their
constitutional right to privacy or due process of law); see also KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE
PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE S 7.7 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
96. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Rewarding Employees for "Wellness", N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1991, at F21 (listing examples of employers giving bonus pay and incentives to employees
who exercise, quit smoking, or even have healthy blood test results).
97. Michael D. Hinds, Cash-Strapped Cities Turn to Companies to Do What Government
Once Did, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1991, at A8.
98. See, e.g., Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, SS 5152-5158, 41 U.S.C. SS 701-707.
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testing-of millions of employees.99 The Drug-Free Workplace
Act of 1988100 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it 1°
require private employers receiving federal grants or contracts
to establish a drug-free workplace, even though these grants and
contracts do not, on their face, require drug testing.10 2 The idea
behind each of the measures is that the threat of loss of employ-
ment will deter illegal drug use when the threat of criminal
sanctions has failed.
Privatizing the government's search functions has several ef-
fects. First, if the government's encouragement and participation
do not rise to the level of state action, these surveillance functions
are immune from Fourth Amendment constraints and can, there-
fore, be more intrusive and pervasive than traditional govern-
mental searches.0 3 Second, regardless of whether the Fourth
Amendment restrictions apply to private sector surveillance, such
surveillance does not utilize governmental resources. This ap-
proach, therefore, expands the scope of government-desired sur-
veillance of individuals. Third, to the extent that private sector
surveillance is coupled with punitive sanctions, such as withhold-
ing employment opportunities from individuals, the government
also succeeds in regulating behavior without expending any of
its own resources.
How far the government will go toward delegating or priva-
tizing its surveillance and control of individual functions is un-
clear, but its drug-testing policies have certainly created a model
that we can expect to find arising in other areas of traditional
governmental surveillance and control.
V. THE SHRINKING OF EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY: A SLIPPERY
SLOPE OF EXPECTATIONS
Regardless of how one defines privacy, the American public
believes strongly that individual privacy is being eroded. In a
99. See regulation contained in Individual Empl. Rts. Man. (BNA) S 595:147-750 (1991).
100. 41 U.S.C. SS 701-707.
101. For Department of Defense regulations, see 48 C.F.R. SS 223.7500-223.7504, 252.223-
7500 (1990). For rules pertinent to the Department of Defense, General Services Admin-
istration, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, see 55 Fed. Reg. 21,679
(1990). For drug-free workplace regulations adopted by the Office of Management and
Budget, see 55 Fed. Reg. 3465 (1990). See also O&B Questions and Answers on Drug-Free
Workplace Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 4947 (1989).
102. See supra note 101.
103. For a discussion of the state action doctrine, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991) and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 614 (1989).
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1990 Harris survey, nearly three out of four Americans agreed
that they have "lost all control over how personal information
about them is circulated and used by companies. 104 Seventy-nine
percent of Americans are concerned about threats to their per-
sonal privacy. 10 5 The increasing use of technology, such as elec-
tronic surveillance and biochemical testing, and the increased use
of computers to store and disseminate large amounts of personal
information, such as financial, medical, educational, and criminal
information, reflect a trend toward a total surveillance society-
one in which we are gradually losing control over our data profile
and decisions that are made about us. The current debate over
whether the United States Constitution affords the people any
privacy, outside of the Fourth Amendment, is indicative of the
peril in which privacy finds itself today.
Part of the reason privacy is being lost is that we, as a society,
do not have a clear definition of what privacy is, and consequently
there is no political consensus regarding a definitive value that
"social progress" must follow. This lack of a social rudder causes
each privacy debate to be fought on the merits of that particular
case rather than by balancing the asserted social interest against
the comprehensive social interest in preserving individual pri-
vacy. To the extent that any privacy debate considers privacy
issues outside the context of the particular case, all prior intru-
sions into privacy, which society has accepted, form a baseline
for comparison to the type of intrusion. Each new intrusion
appears to represent only an incremental diminution of privacy
overall.
This phenomenon is visible in Supreme Court cases. In United
States v. Lee,1 6 the Court held that shining a search light onto a
boat to illuminate the deck did not infringe upon a reasonable
expectation of privacy of the owner or occupants of the boat.
The rule gleaned by the Court in this case was that technology
that merely enhances the visual senses of the government agents
is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. This same principle
was used by the Supreme Court to justify monitoring a person
in possession of a package that contained an electronic tracking
device,1°7 and watching people and places through enhanced aerial
104. Privacy: Survey Finds Public Concern Rising Over Protection of Personal Privacy,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, June 12, 1990, at As.
105. Id.
106. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
107. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) ('Nothing in the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them
at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.").
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photography. 1°8 If privacy can be eroded incrementally, then it
can eventually vanish.
Employment drug testing poses a serious threat to privacy
precisely because of this practice of incrementalism. Because drug
testing involves biochemical surveillance and regulation of the
individual, societal acceptance of this use of toxicology will form
the baseline and gateway for future forms of biochemical sur-
veillance-including genetic testing. These forms of testing will
appear only incrementally more intrusive than employment drug
testing.
Typically, society's response to the introduction of intrusive
technology has not been to ban its use, but, rather, only to
regulate its use. By regulating it, society approves the use of the
new technology that creates a narrower scope of privacy as a
baseline of acceptable intrusions. The few laws that confront the
intrusiveness of computer technology only regulate its use.1°9
Ironically, most regulations are designed to enhance the accuracy,
and thus, the efficiency of the technology. This phenomenon is
apparent in drug-testing legislation. Most of the federal statutes,
state statutes, and regulations pertaining to drug testing in the
workplace describe the circumstances in which tests may be
required. They often regulate the process of testing in order to
reduce false positives and/or to minimize (but not eliminate) the
embarrassment of providing a urine specimen.110 No laws flatly
prohibit drug testing.'
The Supreme Court has contributed to this transparent pro-
tection of privacy by the toothless analytical model it uses to
implement the values of the Fourth Amendment. To warrant any
Fourth Amendment protection, the government's surveillance
technique must infringe upon "an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."" 2 Supreme Court
precedents have not revealed how to identify a "society" or
which values or spokespersons of that society are to be counted
108. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) ("The mere fact that
human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to
constitutional problems."); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) ("The Fourth
Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement
officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares").
109. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)-(q). The Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. S 2001 (1990), may be an exception. However, the
degree of inaccuracy of such tests rather than the degree of their intrusiveness was
probably the real catalyst for enacting this legislation.
110. A SUBSTANCE ABUSE TESTING ACT S 3(b) (Task Force on the Drug-Free Workplace,
Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Proposed Official Draft 1991).
111. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (noting that
drug testing must conform to Fourth Amendment standards for reasonable searches).
112. Id.
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in determining which expectations of privacy are reasonable. By
definition, the scope of privacy protected under the Fourth
Amendment is culturally dependent-and lately, we are told,
context based.113 Thus, the threshold test for Fourth Amendment
protection is subject to control by those forces that have the
power to manipulate society's expectations and not by any in-
dependent privacy value. The more the government and private
employers intrude on individual privacy, the less the Fourth
Amendment protects privacy. It should be easy to see that such
a test fails to provide a meaningful check on the government,
which is the very entity the Fourth Amendment was designed
to control. Most students of the Fourth Amendment believe, as
Justice Marshall has written, that the Fourth Amendment must
create entitlements to expectations of privacy that neither the
government nor society can manipulate away." 4
In the last twenty years, the Court has refused to find that
numerous government surveillance techniques, many of which
involve the use of technology, infringe upon a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy; these techniques are thus not even worthy of
the Fourth Amendment's procedural protections.1" 5
113. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) ("Because the reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy, as well as the appropriate standard for a search, is understood
to differ according to context, it is essential first to delineate the boundaries of the
workplace context.").
114. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Fourth Amendment "assigns to the judiciary some prescriptive responsibility.").
115. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990)
(upholding police sobriety checkpoints without warrant, probable cause, or individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
674 (1989) (allowing drug testing of railroad employees without warrant, probable cause,
or individualized suspicion of wrongdoing); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618 (same holding as Von
Raab); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (upholding helicopter surveillance of
backyard greenhouse from 400 feet); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 44 (1988)
(allowing rummaging through and reading information contained in an individual's trash
once it has been left outside for pickup); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
239 (1986) (allowing aerial surveillance of a 2000 acre manufacturing facility using a
sophisticated aerial mapping camera which is capable of enlargement on a scale of 1"
equalling 20' or greater without significant loss of detail or resolution); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (allowing aerial surveillance from a fixed-wing aircraft
of a backyard from 1000 feet); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (validating
the secret use of specially trained dogs to sniff packages and luggage in airports for
drugs); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (allowing the secret tracking of
persons by way of electronic devices concealed in packages in the possession of the
individual); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (allowing the recording of telephone
numbers dialed from one's home without the consent of the telephone subscriber or
caller); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977) (upholding state maintenance of a
computerized databank with the names and addresses of patients for whom Schedule Il
EMPLOYMENT DRUG TESTING
Even if the Court finds that a surveillance technique infringes
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment
may provide only limited, if not ephemeral, protection for indi-
vidual privacy. This limited concern is due to the Court's inter-
pretation of how the Fourth Amendment restricts governmental
action. In most cases involving police searches, the Court requires
a warrant and probable cause, but, of course, allows numerous
exceptions. In cases that do not involve searches by police offi-
cers, however, the Court engages in a free-wheeling ad hoc
balancing test which pits society's interest in the search against
the individual's interest in freedom from the intrusion. Several
members of the Court have strongly condemned this test. As
Justice Brennan wrote in his dissenting opinion in New Jersey v.
T.L. O.,116
In the past several Terms, this Court has produced a succession
of Fourth Amendment opinions in which "balancing tests" have
been applied to resolve various questions concerning the proper
scope of official searches. The Court has begun to apply a
"balancing test" to determine whether a particular category of
searches intrudes upon expectations of privacy that merit
Fourth Amendment protection. It applies a "balancing test" to
determine whether a warrant is necessary to conduct a search.
In today's opinion, it employs a "balancing test" to determine
what standard should govern the constitutionality of a given
category of searches. Should a search turn out to be unreason-
able after application of all of these "balancing tests," the
Court then applies an additional "balancing test" to decide
whether the evidence resulting from the search must be ex-
cluded.
All of these "balancing tests" amount to brief nods by the
Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian 'alculus while
drugs have been prescribed); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) (allowing
the inspection of personal bank records without the consent of the bank customer); Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (allowing the distribution of flyers based upon an
undisclosed arrest record falsely stating that an individual was a known active shoplifter);
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (allowing bank reporting to the
federal government of customers' financial transactions); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1970) (involving secret electronic surveillance of conversations with only one party
consenting to the electronic surveillance); see also United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159 (1977) (allowing the FBI to order telephone company to record telephone
numbers dialed by an individual); Laird v. Tatum, 401 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that the
photographing of political protesters and maintaining dossiers on them does not infringe
upon their First Amendment rights to associational privacy).
116. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial
will.
117
This weak interpretation of the Fourth Amendment allowed
the Court to permit suspicionless biochemical testing of work-
ers.118 Who would have ever thought that the analytic test em-
ployed in Camara,1 9 which involved searches of buildings, and
Terry v. Ohio,'2 which involved temporary stops and pat downs,
would eventually yield cases upholding the systematic blood
testing of workers? Under the Court's test, each new form of
surveillance that is given a Fourth Amendment imprimatur be-
comes a springboard for tolerance of further incursions into
individual privacy.
The recent drug-testing cases illustrate how one decision per-
mitting government surveillance forms the basis for permitting
a more intrusive search in the future and how powerful institu-
tions through fiat set the standards for determining how intrusive
the Court views each surveillance teehnique.
Important to its holding in the drug-testing cases was the fact
that blood and urine testing of the workers represented to the
Court only a limited or minimal intrusion into their privacy. The
Court offered four justifications for this view: the limited infor-
mational scope of the search, the manner of the search, and the
cultural and governmental environments in which the search took
place. Regarding the cultural environment in which the search
took place, the Court determined that brood tests were not "'an
unduly extensive imposition on an individual's privacy and bodily
integrity,' ,121 because such tests "'are commonplace in these
days of periodic physical examinations.' "'2 Schmerber had held
that a blood alcohol test could be involuntarily administered to
a motorist if there was probable cause to believe the blood
contained evidence of intoxication.23 As the Court in Schmerber
wrote:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere
chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence
117. Id. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
118. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
120. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
121. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985)).
122. Id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
123. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70.
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of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found,
these fundamental human interests require law officers to
suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there
is an immediate search.12A
The Court in Skinner, however, failed to cite any evidence
showing the pervasiveness of blood tests today. The blood tests
referred to in Schmerber were mostly voluntary diagnostic tests.
Twenty years later, the Court in Skinner cited one reference in
Schmerber indicating that many people experience a blood test
in one form or another during their lifetime to support the blood
testing of workers in a totally different context for a totally
different purpose. Moreover, in Schmerber, a situation that an
individual may encounter no more than once a year (and for most
people far less frequently) became characterized as a "common-
place" event for the purpose of determining the intrusiveness of
drug tests in a different context.'2
In Skinner, the Court said the most important reason why
drug testing of railroad workers did not infringe upon a signifi-
cant interest in privacy was that the railroad industry has long
been regulated heavily to ensure safety, and that such regulations
have focused in part on the health and fitness of employees who
may have operational duties.126 So long as the federal or state
government and industry institute some regulations on the fitness
of workers, their right to privacy vis-A-vis other invasions of
privacy is diminished. Such reasoning effectively permits govern-
ment and industry to determine the Fourth Amendment's limits
on their destruction of individual privacy. Perhaps if the govern-
ment and telephone companies began conducting warrantless
bugging of residential telephones, and the practice was not struck
down for twenty years, it too would be considered commonplace;
one's expectations of telephone privacy would be diminished by
virtue of such regulations and surveillance. In Von Raab, the
Court did not even try to tie a reduced expectation of privacy
to a history of employee regulation, stating simply that the class
of employees who were subject to testing should expect to be
tested.' 2 Because they should expect to be tested, such testing
represents a constitutionally minimal invasion of such employees'
privacy.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 771.
126. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
127. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989).
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Although the holdings in Skinner and Von Raab appear to be
based on rather limited factual circumstances, courts have cited
these decisions many times over the past two years as authority
for upholding the random testing of numerous classes of work-
ers.128 As Judge Harry Edwards has aptly written, "Constitutional
principles, once abandoned, are not easily reclaimed."'1
Although the purpose of this Article is not to propose a new
analytic model for the Fourth Amendment, the Court clearly
must develop some type of prescriptive test that prevents the
government and powerful institutions in society from manipulat-
ing the scope of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.
We cannot turn back the clock of privacy once it is removed.
Even worse, invasions of privacy are contagious; each intrusion
will lead to greater intrusions unless we insist upon the protection
of moral values-such as privacy-and are willing to accept the
price of a less efficient society to preserve these values. In light
of the means that we are using to fight illegal drug abuse and
the consequences those means will have on the future of privacy,
we must ask ourselves whether we are purchasing a drug-free
society at the price of a privacy-free one.
VI. INCREASING USE OF PREDICTIVE JUDGMENTS AND PROFILES
Whenever technology enables us to acquire sufficient data
about groups of people to make predictions about members of
the group (for instance, that applicants testing positive have a
higher rate of absenteeism or failure than those testing negative),
profiles emerge. Our society is increasingly making decisions
about individuals based upon "risk factors." Drug testing repre-
sents another model for making judgments about each member
of a group based on statistical characteristics that apply only to
the group as a whole. Such judgments can often be very inac-
curate and unfair to many individuals within the group.130
128. See Craig M. Cornish, Drug-Use Testing in the American Workplace: Recent Cases
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
129. Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting).
130. One of the major problems inherent in drug-testing technology is the consequences
of the false-positive test. False-positives can arise from mislabeling of specimens or from
laboratory error. Laboratory dependability or reliability is determined by submitting
quality control specimens and demanding reasonable proficiency, but the evidence sug-
gests that laboratories perform substantially better when they know a submitted specimen
is for quality control than when such specimens are submitted blindly. False-positive
results may occur in one to two percent of cases; that is of great concern with mass
testing of a low prevalence phenomenon. For those mislabeled as positive, the conse-
quences can be catastrophic. For a discussion of the predictive value of drug testing, see




The absence of data correlating a positive preemployment drug
test with subsequent on-the-job performance has not deterred
thousands of employers from assuming that everyone who tests
positive on a preemployment or employment drug test win prove
less productive or more detrimental than individuals who test
negative. This result is due in part to the unwillingness of some
employers to accept any risk, which is a social hazard produced
by predictive judgments.
Some employers justify denying employment to illegal drug
users based upon the deterrent value of that act. In such cases,
it makes no difference how low the predictive value of the test
may be. Test criteria becomes acceptable for reasons unrelated
to what the test says or predicts about the person who is denied
employment. The simplicity of a numerical score also seduces the
decisionmaker into giving the "score" more weight than it is due
merely because of its simplicity compared to the complexity of
making individualized predictions about future performance.
On a broader scale, the increased use of predictive judgments
can collide with the principles of meritorious advancement and
autonomy. By acquiring large amounts of information and making
predictive judgments about groups, individuals who grow up with
certain genetic, biochemical, or behavioral profiles may find it
difficult to overcome the odds of these predictive judgments. The
net effect of using such information may be to reduce decisions
based on merit and to discourage individuals from working hard
to achieve beyond their predicted levels of achievement. This
problem has existed in the Soviet Union and in feudal societies
in which individuals grew up with their life plans already mapped
out; deviation from the plan was usually an impossible dream.
Under the concept of freedom in the United States, however,
opportunity should be open to everyone so that individuals can
believe realistically that they have a chance of achieving their
dreams.
VII. EROSION OF PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Drug testing also erodes the presumption of innocence. For
many employers with drug-testing policies, those persons who
refuse to be searched are treated exactly as persons who violate
the employer's policies or test positive.13 1 If a majority of people
131. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660 (upholding Customs Service decision not to hire
applicants refusing to take the drug test-the same penalty as for individuals who test
positive).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
volunteer to be tested, suspicion necessarily focuses upon those
individuals who refuse to be tested.1 2 The common-but false-
adage that if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to lose
by being searched, operates heavily in our social environment to
point the finger of suspicion of wrongdoing at individuals who
refuse to be searched. Thus, society punishes people not for
wrongdoing, but for merely refusing to be searched.
As it operates in the United States today, systematic drug
testing can result in a greater punishment to the person who
does nothing more than attempt to assert his right of privacy
and bodily integrity than to a person convicted of a drug-related
offense that results in only probation or work release. Not only
do individuals who are terminated for refusing to be searched
lose employment, but the stigma attached to a drug-testing-
related firing may make it very difficult to find future employ-
ment. Employers in any field are likely to believe that a person
who was fired for refusing to take a drug test attempted to avoid
detection of illegal drug use. In such a situation, second employers
may not want to take a chance with the applicant.
The presumption of innocence not only guards against punish-
ing innocent people, it also makes a social statement about the
dignity of the individual. The presumption of innocence maintains
that individuals will be trusted unless proof exists not to trust
them. By searching groups without cause, society thus shows its
inherent distrust of the individual.
VIII. THE EROSION OF DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY
The notion that the government and large organizations can
functionally invade the body and spy on our biochemical systems
without cause represents a qualitative leap from traditional meth-
ods of search. This notion allows the government and large
organizations to acquire qualitatively new types of information-
biochemical information-which, until recently, has never been
in the public domain and over which the individual has always
assumed that he or she has control. By breaking this element of
control, society weakens the individual's self-control and feelings
of self-worth.
The ideas of individual control and self-worth are not simply
intrinsically moral notions. Depression may result from feelings




ernment increasingly gathers information about us and monitors
our behavior and biochemistry, each added form of monitoring
weakens the degree to which individuals have control over their
actions. The ability to stake out an informational sphere of
privacy is an essential element of dignity and self-control.
If individual rights are valuable, then we must be willing to
protect those rights even if the protection of those rights may
conflict with obvious societal interests. The concepts of autonomy
and dignity engender the notion that every individual is intrin-
sically valuable as a person regardless of whether that person
benefits society. The fact that society becomes better off as we
take away more privacy is not in and of itself a valid reason to
override individual privacy if we do, in fact, value it. Something
more than a societal gain should be required as a condition for
infringing upon a fundamental right such as dignity. In other
words, an individual is not merely an instrument by which society
betters itself; dignity affords the individual this respect.
Dignity may be a somewhat amorphous concept, but it is one
that we should preserve in our society. With advances in our
technological ability to study the macroscopic effects of individual
behavior and social policy, to assign numerical values to the
causes and effects and costs and benefits, and to measure these
quantitative benefits, moral principles have suffered. Moral val-
ues are compromised in part because they are not easily meas-
urable in a quantitative cost-benefit analysis, whereas other
factors, like the economic effects of social policy, are more easily
measurable by our computer brains. Other explanations may
exist, but certainly our ability to perform massive and complex
quantitative evaluations has driven us to value increasingly those
decisions that appear to improve society through manipulation
of quantitative aspects of life. Cast to the side, however, are
unquantifiable moral values such as privacy, dignity, and auton-
omy.
The loss of individual values in constitutional law stands as
proof that we are gradually losing interest in those values;
individual dignity faces extinction. We increasingly see the indi-
vidual not as a value in itself, but rather, as only an instrument
through which we can shape a more perfect society. In the past
twenty years, the Court has reduced the protection of many
individual rights in the Constitution.133 The Court has allowed
133. See Edwin Chemerinsky, Foreward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV.
43 (1989); Robin West, Foreward: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1990).
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the government to kill people consciously and deliberately in
order to either satisfy our thirst for vengeance or to deter
homicide.3' It has denied adults the right to choose their sex
partners if the sex partner is of the same gender;1' denied women
the opportunity of military service;136 and denied religious liberty
to all religious groups if state or local governmental entities have
criminalized their conduct for purposes unrelated to intentionally
suppressing religious practices.13 7 The Court has also dropped
judicial integrity as a basis for employing the exclusionary rule;w
dropped, or at least only paid lip service to, the fairness interest
in the due process clause;'3 and has certainly taken a dim view
of privacy. 40
To the extent that a society is measured by the means it uses
to enforce its laws, one cannot help asking whether our society
sees any limits to the infringement of individual privacy and
dignity in order to eliminate drug abuse. Perhaps authorities
may decide as the next step to conduct house-to-house preventive
searches in neighborhoods in which drug dealing is prevalent.
Regardless of the next step, however, it is clear that neither
the public nor the courts are standing up for individual dignity.
Even the goals of tort law are shifting away from compensating
the victim to maximizing the utility of the law to reduce net
injuries. As one scholar recently observed, "Landes and Posner
have played a major role in replacing the traditional legal justi-
fication of the tort system based on notions of fairness and
compensation with a concern for efficiency and deterrence."''
134. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
135. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding state sodomy statutes).
136. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
137. Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
138. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
139. In determining the scope of procedural due process, the Court recently employed:
the now familiar threefold inquiry requiring consideration of "the private
interest that will be affected by the official action"; "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards"; and lastly "the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail."
Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2112 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976)). No mention is made of fairness to the individual.
140. See Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
141. John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution,
102 HARv. L. REV. 1047, 1056 (1989) (commenting on WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)). Professor Steven Shavell rec-
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By examining the biochemistry of an individual and allowing
this type of information to become a part of important decisions
made about an individual, we begin to shift from looking at the
individual as a soul with emotions to seeing the individual solely
as a sum of various biological and molecular parts. This shift
tends to depersonalize and dehumanize relationships between
society and the individual and among individuals. As we become
capable of reading the genetic codes of a fetus early in the
gestation cycle, society, the government, and large institutions
will place increasing pressure on women to abort fetuses pre-
dicted to produce lives that are less than full and would prove
costly to society.4 2
If nothing about the individual is sacrosanct, untouchable from
without, and controllable by the individual, what does autonomy
mean? The more institutions conduct surveillance, the less control
the individual has over his or her own life. Institutions conduct
surveillance to make decisions about people, and those decisions
are frequently decisions that limit, rather than expand, an indi-
vidual's choices. If, in the next fifty years, biochemical surveil-
lance becomes a widespread means of monitoring behavior, what
questions will we be asking about the relationship between so-
ciety and the individual? Will we urge that one's genetic code
should be sacrosanct -and cannot be spied on or manipulated, or
will we argue that only certain genes within the entire genetic
code are off limits to the government and to our employers?
The institutionalization of employee drug testing raises many
moral questions. It is hastening the use of technology in new
ways that are transforming the relationship between the individ-
ual and society. It may be too late for society to hold down the
efficient effect of technological "progress." Unless we are willing
to become the slaves of technology, we must erect some moral
values intended to preserve the dignity of human beings as a
barrier to technological change. To do this, we must first be able
to see the social effects of each new use of technology.
ommends that victims of tort injuries should not receive compensation for nonpecuniary
losses, but that tortfeasors should be required to pay to the state a sum equal to such
losses. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 234 (1987). As Professor
John Donohue observes, "This recommendation is consistent with the basic deterrence
principle that it is more important for the defendant to pay than for the victim to
receive." Donohue, supra, at 1065.
142. In Los Angeles, persons calling into a radio talk show chastised a television
personality for bringing her pregnancy to term because, as a result of a defective gene
she possesses, her offspring has a 50-50 chance of developing a malformity of the hands
and feet. Steven Holmes, Radio Talk About TV Anchor's Disability Stirs Ire in Los
Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1991, at B18.
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